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LEGAL NARRATIVE, LANGUAGE
IDEOLOGY, AND THE FINANCIAL
REHABILITATION OF IRAQ
HADI NICHOLAS DEEB*
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2005, as coalition forces struggled against a resourceful insurgency in
Iraq, a team of bankers and lawyers strove to draft the country’s first-ever
disclosure documents for its commercial debt-for-debt exchange offer. A
member of the group, frustrated at its inability to write conventional risk
factors,1 wryly suggested that enclosing an IED (the infamous “improvised
explosive devices” raging through Baghdad at the time) would be more to the
point. Morbid as the comment was, it illustrates that Robert Cover’s maxim,
that “[l]egal interpretation takes place on the field of pain and death,” applies
also to contexts other than adversarial dispute.2 Not every client, sovereign
debtor or otherwise, comes with trouble as dramatic as Iraq’s. But every lawyer
must craft a client’s trouble into a morally persuasive narrative that includes not
only the detached, rational, and deductive emphasis of modern law, but also the
swirls of anger, love, and other emotions that advocates from the mythical
Atticus Finch to ordinary law-firm junior associates sense are indispensable to
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1. See, e.g., James Rice, Cleary Advises Iraq on First Eurobond Issue, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Feb.
2006, at 8, 8 (quoting issuer’s counsel as saying, “It was a particular challenge to structure a bond
transaction where there is no standard disclosure.”). To be clear, recollection indicates that the lawyer
quoted did not make the comment about IEDs.
2. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
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their mission.3 While legal scholarship often contrasts these two aspects as “law”
versus “narrative,” in fact, legal narratives meld rational and emotional logic,
albeit in language that is ideologically inflected to suppress the emotional
features. Lacking the centralized decisionmaking forum, adversarial format, and
final arbiter that structure litigation narratives, transactional lawyers must
mobilize other media to make a persuasive case. For example, a speech crafted
by counsel and given by Iraq’s then-Minister of Finance in 2004 demonstrates
how reason and emotion are blended together into a story of suffering and a
plan to resolve it. The speech became important both for negotiating the legal
resolution of Iraqi and, arguably, creditors’ suffering when parties gathered at
the bargaining table, and for transforming that table talk into substantive
provisions of Iraq’s debt restructuring deal.
II
IRAQ AND PROJECT 688
Between seizing absolute power in 1979 and losing it in 2003, Saddam
Hussein not only squandered a reserve of forty billion dollars but also
accumulated a mountain of debt to other governments and private creditors—
ranging from huge construction companies to mom-and-pop trade suppliers.4
That debt was thrown into default when United Nations sanctions severed
Iraq’s financial ties to the world after its 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Following the
overthrow of Saddam, the new Iraqi government’s accountants eventually
reconciled breach-of-contract claims against Iraq totaling approximately $140
billion (including late interest). Next to the country’s ongoing violence, this debt
was the biggest problem facing the new government. The World Bank
estimated that even fantastical 33% annual growth would have left Iraq’s debtto-GDP ratio at 600% to 900%, many times higher than other, less-devastated
middle-income borrowers such as Argentina and Russia had recently faced.
Uncertainty about the fate of this debt stirred political contention inside and
outside Iraq, notably through an attempt to revive the doctrine of “odious
debts,”5 and obstructed normalization of Iraq’s economic and financial
operations, especially rehabilitation of its all-important petroleum sector. As

3. See, e.g., MAX ATKINSON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT: THE ORGANIZATION OF
VERBAL INTERACTION IN JUDICIAL SETTINGS 195 (1979) (noting that moral imputation is a more
regular feature of courtroom talk than everyday conversation); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: Telling
Stories, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2092–93 (1989) (explaining how a discursive shift away from orthodox
legal “objectivism” and toward emotion, if within doctrinal bounds, can help weak parties win cases).
4. See Hadi Nicholas Deeb, Project 688: The Restructuring of Iraq’s Saddam-Era Debt,
RESTRUCTURING NEWSL. (Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Winter 2007, at
3, 3–9 (providing further background for the information summarized here).
5. Groups that organized online include Jubilee Iraq, http://www.jubileeiraq.org, and Probe
International, http://www.odiousdebts.org. See generally Lee C. Buchheit, G. Mitu Gulati & Robert M.
Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 DUKE L.J. 1201 (2007); James V. Feinerman, Odious
Debt, Old and New: The Legal Intellectual History of an Idea, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193
(Autumn 2007); Anna Gelpern, Odious, Not Debt, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (Summer 2007).
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with other distressed sovereign debtors, lenders hesitated to provide new
money that might be drained to service old claims. Unlike others, Iraq’s debt
stock consisted not of a few series of notes or bonds, or a handful of large
syndicated loans, but of thousands of individual claims held by hundreds of
varied creditors. Soon after the U.S. administrator ceded power to a sovereign
Iraqi government on June 28, 2004, the new authorities hired accountants,
lawyers, and no fewer than four financial institutions to restructure Iraq’s debt
to manageable levels. The senior law partner on the deal nicknamed the
assignment “Project 688,” inspired by a randomly generated law-firm code and
633 Squadron, a classic film about the odds facing fighter pilots ordered to
destroy a Nazi fortress.
III
METHODS: NARRATIVE AND LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES
The personal and affective tone imparted to the work of the legal and
financial experts by the “Project 688” moniker exemplifies a narrative blend
common in legal discourse. Core attributes of narrative include: (1) an
instigating “trouble” that prompts reactions, such as a protagonist’s attempts at
resolution, with consequences that may generate further troubles;6 (2) a tension
between authenticity—the validation of immediate but inchoate experience—
on one hand, and coherence—the attempt to impose causality and consistency
on and across experience—on the other, which drives a narrative forward;7
(3) an implicit recognition of how past, present, and future are bundled together
in the human experience of time,8 so that narrating the past is a way to assess a
proposed course of action (and vice versa);9 and (4) some degree of
“dedicat[ion] to maintaining morality.”10

6. See Jerome Bruner, The Narrative Construction of Reality, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 1, 16 (1991).
7. ELINOR OCHS & LISA CAPPS, LIVING NARRATIVE 284–86 (2001).
8. See Paul Ricoeur, Narrative Time, in ON NARRATIVE, 165–86 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1981)
(applying phenomenological theories of temporality to narrative).
9. Elinor Ochs, Stories that Step into the Future, in SOCIOLINGUISTIC PERSPECTIVES ON
REGISTER 106 (Douglas Biber & Edward Finegan eds., 1994).
10. OCHS & CAPPS, supra note 7, at 102. The linguistic anthropological analysis of narrative on
which this article draws, as exemplified by Ochs and Capps’s book, builds on pioneering work in other
fields. See generally WILLIAM LABOV & JOSHUA WALETZKY, NARRATIVE ANALYSIS: ORAL
VERSIONS OF PERSONAL EXPERIENCE (1967) (sociolinguistics); MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, SPEECH GENRES
AND OTHER LATE ESSAYS (Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist eds., 1986) (literary theory); MARTIN
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 1962)
(phenomenology).
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Law is suffused with these narrative qualities.11 Resolving trouble is its
raison d’être, fitting the personal events of particular cases into generally
applicable categories is its central tension, sustaining that fit across time by
coordinating past cases and future harmony is its institutional function, and
maintaining community moral standards is its normative mandate. Scholars of
legal narrative often address one or more of these qualities implicitly or
explicitly.12 Typically, their purpose in doing so is to balance “law” that is purely
abstract, detached, logical, and deductive—in a word, rational—with a distinct,
but equally consequential, “narrative” aspect of legal practices that is
predominantly emotional, personal, or humanistic.13 By contrast, the central
claim of this article is that rational logic and emotional logic intertwine in the
construction of a legal narrative as a single unit that unfolds through the
discourse of legal argumentation and decisionmaking.14 That is, the language of
legal narratives depends on the merger of abstract, deductive reasoning with the
emotion familiar from personal narrative.
This dualistic intertwinement is often concealed by a language ideology of
the legal profession. Language ideologies, which are as pervasive as language
itself, refer to the naturalization of only one (or a limited number) of the

11. “Law” in this article refers to legal traditions recognizably traceable to Roman law or English
common law, which might be termed “Western.” See RENE DAVID & JOHN C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR
LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 17–25 (3d ed. 1985) (phylogenic explanation and its defense).
Other systems may have similarly ideological views of narrative as an affective genre often marked by
gender and inappropriate for legal reasoning. See SUSAN HIRSCH, PRONOUNCING AND PERSEVERING
25–33 (1998) (explaining how the use of narrative in Islamic courts in Kenya is considered to be an
opprobrious, female practice). In addition, contact between systems may produce heterogeneous
linguistic practices. See, e.g., JUSTIN B. RICHLAND, ARGUING WITH TRADITION (2008) (discussing the
blend of Anglo-American and Hopi law in Hopi tribal courts).
12. See generally ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW (2000);
WILLIAM CONKLIN, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF MODERN LEGAL DISCOURSE (1998); KARL N.
LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICTS AND CASE LAW IN
PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941); KIM LANE SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS (1988); JAMES B.
WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW (1985); Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983);
Richard K. Sherwin, Law Frames: Historical Truth and Narrative Necessity in a Criminal Case, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 39 (1994).
13. DEREK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED 5 (1987) (justifying as nevertheless law-oriented his
“unorthodox” use of fictional narrative in light of the rationalist strictures of conventional legal genres);
ROBIN WEST, NARRATIVE, AUTHORITY, AND LAW 152–63 (1993) (utilizing a metaphoric contrast of
empathic “literary woman” with individualistically rational “economic man”); David Ray Papke &
Kathleen H. McManus, Narrative and the Appellate Opinion, 23 LEGAL STUD. F. 449, 450–51 (1999)
(contrasting experiential, situated “narrative” with abstract, analytic “arguments”); Richard Weisberg,
Proclaiming Trials as Narratives: Premises and Pretenses, in LAW’S STORIES 64 (Peter Brooks & Paul
Gewirtz eds., 1996) (describing the common mantra of “law is narrative” as a display of compassion “as
against a hard, cold world of legal abstraction”).
14. Underlying this claim is the more basic point that factual description and legal discussion “are
integrally intertwined, shaping and framing one another.” Elizabeth Mertz, Consensus and Dissent in
U.S. Legal Opinions: Narrative Structure and Social Voices, in DISORDERLY DISCOURSE: NARRATIVE,
CONFLICT, AND INEQUALITY 135 (Charles L. Briggs, ed., 1996) [hereinafter DISORDERLY
DISCOURSE]. This observation suggests that they are not distinct analytic units in terms of their
consequences for legal outcomes.
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multiple possible meanings to which a piece of language can point.15 When that
piece of language is put to social use, the naturalized meaning thus organizes
social relationships in one or another particular way.16
One powerful naturalization of this kind in law is the fusion of rational logic
with a more general human tendency to view language as purely referential
(that is, having a straightforward semantic definition as in a dictionary),17 and
therefore manipulable in transparent ways. This marriage serves the legal
preference for universal or at least generally applicable principles. Language
that appears to be context-dependent becomes marked as emotional and
inappropriate as a basis for law.18 The Enlightenment project to purge language
of contextual particulars and create a cosmopolitan discourse of detached
reason remains a wellspring of this legal ideology.19 Law students continue to be
professionalized into it as they are encouraged, humiliated, and even
ventriloquized away from personal reactions like silence, gut feeling, or explicit
moral claims and toward the exchange of competing referential arguments.20

15. Michael Silverstein, Language Structure and Linguistic Ideology, in THE ELEMENTS: A
PARASESSION ON LINGUISTIC UNITS AND LEVELS 195, 204–07 (Paul R. Clyne et al. eds., 1979).
Language ideologies feature prominently in efforts at standardization, for example, dictionaries and
legal regulation. See, e.g., ROSINA LIPPI-GREEN, ENGLISH WITH AN ACCENT: LANGUAGE,
IDEOLOGY, AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES 152–70 (1997) (describing how an ideology
of standard English works against speakers who have an accent in employment discrimination trials).
16. Paul V. Kroskrity, Regimenting Languages: Language Ideological Perspectives, in REGIMES OF
LANGUAGE 1, 5 (Paul V. Kroskrity ed., 2000) [hereinafter REGIMES]; Kathryn A. Woolard,
Introduction: Language Ideology as a Field of Inquiry, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES 3, 10 (Bambi B.
Schieffelin et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES].
17. Elizabeth Mertz & Bernard Weissbourd, Legal Ideology and Linguistic Theory: Variability and
Its Limits, in SEMIOTIC MEDIATION 261, 273–76 (Elizabeth Mertz & Richard Parmentier eds., 1985).
18. Folk culture’s derision of lawyers as cold-hearted and skilled at twisting words could be
characterized as an implicit exposure of this professional language ideology, which clearly conflicts with
nonlawyers’ sense of how language does or should operate. Belying the ideology, scholars have pointed
out that “relational” narratives are as logical as “rule-oriented” ones. E.g., JOHN M. CONLEY &
WILLIAM M. O’BARR, JUST WORDS 72–73 (2005) (describing the reception given to courtroom
testimony delivered in these different styles); CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE, at xiii, 19, 73
(2d ed. 1993) (establishing the bases in gender psychology for this bifurcation).
19. See RICHARD BAUMAN & CHARLES L. BRIGGS, VOICES OF MODERNITY 29–59 (2003)
(elaborating how Francis Bacon and John Locke purposefully undertook to reshape the
conceptualization of language). One ironic early result was the marginalization of the natural law views
espoused by anti-slavery U.S. judges as mere personal preference during the ascendancy of positivist
formalism. ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 22–
30 (1975).
20. See generally ELIZABETH MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW SCHOOL: LEARNING TO “THINK
LIKE A LAWYER” (2007). The ancient tension between law and morality has led to both their
categorical collapse and their categorical opposition. See HERBERT L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW
7–8 (2d ed. 1961) (recognizing overlap between law and morality but criticizing jurisprudents since St.
Augustine for equating them). The legal realists emphasized the opposition as part of their
methodology. See Karl Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound, 44
HARV. LAW REV. 1222, 1251–52 (1931) (defending realists for treating “Is” and “Ought” as analytically
distinct). Their treatment of the tension as an analytic issue prior to being a normative one may have
contributed to the identification of morality with the emotional, personal, or humanistic, by mapping
the distinction between law and morality onto the one between analytic law and those other
descriptors. Accounts of the Iraqi debt restructuring exhibit this mapping. See, e.g., Lee C. Buchheit &
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Lawyers and judges perpetuate it.21 And it surfaces in the scholarly bifurcation
between rational law and emotional narrative discussed above.22
This bifurcation nonetheless is illusory. It is structurally possible to suppress,
but not to eliminate, the context-dependent meanings of language that are
concealed by the focus on a naturalized referential meaning.23 The inherent
multiplicity within language is part of what makes it possible for people to
express and debate the conflicts that underlie legal discourse.24 Legal texts
themselves are impossible to read without this multiplicity.25 Furthermore, it is
increasingly well-established that human cognition and its social expression
depend on concurrent rational and emotional operations.26 From a cognitive
psychology perspective, the dichotomy between rational law and personal
narrative may be a false one.27
As a result, this language ideology takes shape within legal narratives as a
lopsided dichotomy that valorizes the ostensibly referential expression of
rational logic and suppresses context-dependent emotional logic, although both
persist together. This pattern is evident in the speech by the Iraqi finance
minister. Grammatically, the connection between syntax and semantics

G. Mitu Gulati, Odious Debt and Nation-Building: When the Incubus Departs, 60 MAINE L. REV. 478,
484 (2000) (quoting Iraqi officials who spoke contrastingly of the “legal” grounds of odious debt and
the “moral” grounds of odious regime).
21. See, e.g., GREGORY M. MATOESIAN, LAW AND THE LANGUAGE OF IDENTITY 21–24, 37–44,
227–30 (2001) (showing how courtroom interaction among rape trial participants distributes genderbased evaluations as to “legally valid” versus “suspect” actions according to a “patriarchal logic of
sexual rationality”; and criticizing rape-law reformers for replicating this orientation); Charles
Goodwin, Professional Vision, 96 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 606, 618 (1994) (examining how defense
attorneys for the police officers who beat Rodney King diced and spliced the video to construct an
ostensibly rational narrative of escalating resistance and response); John Haviland, Ideologies of
Language: Some Reflections on Language and U.S. Law, 105 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 764, 767–68
(2003) (demonstrating a U.S. trial judge’s problematic faith in unproblematic, “referentially
transparent” translation).
22. Professional ideologies of language are as pervasive as any other (and undoubtedly lurk in the
present article). See Paul V. Kroskrity, Language Ideologies in the Expression and Representation of
Arizona Tewa Identity, in REGIMES, supra note 16, at 330 (examining the ideologies that framed a midcentury Native American anthropologist’s study of speakers of his ancestral language).
23. JACQUES DERRIDA, DE LA GRAMMATOLOGIE 208 (1967) (arguing that the attempt to
suppress one half of a binary pair ironically ensures its intellectual persistence); Michael Silverstein,
The Uses and Utility of Ideology: A Commentary, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES, supra note 16, at 123,
138–39 (explaining that ideological layers to language go “all the way down”).
24. Charles L. Briggs, Introduction, in DISORDERLY DISCOURSE, supra note 14, at 3, 3–4, 13–16
(explaining how competing narratives of a conflict can deploy the indexical and iconic functions of
language to complicate referential meaning).
25. See JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL
CRITICISM, at x–xi, 28–34 (1990) (discussing the context-dependence of rational logic and providing an
example from the Federalist Papers). It is evident that the ideological tendency to treat narrative as
extralegal nevertheless remains strong within legal scholarship. See RICHLAND, supra note 11, at 117–
18 (reviewing debates over the relationship between law and narrative and identifying numerous gaps
and inconsistencies within that debate).
26. See generally ANTONIO R. DAMASIO, DESCARTES’ ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE
HUMAN BRAIN (1994); JONATHAN LEAR, LOVE AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE (1990).
27. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 106 (2001).
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accomplishes two narrative effects.28 First, the grammar invokes past
categorized narratives (precedents) to build a rational case for a desired action.
Second, the grammar contextualizes the present undecided narrative (the
problem) in emotional terms to make the negative case against a failure to act
as desired (that is, leaving the problem un-rationalized).29
Rather than a bifurcation between narrative style and legal substance,30 style
and substance are both present in each strand of the parallel structure of
rational and emotional logics. Parallelism gives language its poetic qualities,31
which, in turn, undergird rhetorical persuasion.32 Striking the right (lopsided)
balance between reason and emotion helps persuade an audience steeped in the
professional ideology but also attuned to linguistic cues about emotion that are
essential to interpretation and response.33 First, these cues can signal an appeal
to empathetic solidarity and remind listeners of shared values they would want
vindicated in their own lives.34 The balance between rational action and
emotional inaction also facilitates the distribution of moral responsibility for
Iraq’s predicament and its resolution across parties.35 Second, the performance

28. See infra Figure 1. The modifier, “meta-pragmatic,” in that table means “talk about talk.” See
Carlo L. Prevignano & Aldo di Luzio, A Discussion with John J. Gumperz, in LANGUAGE AND
INTERACTION 7, 15–16 (Susan L. Eerdmans et al. eds., 2003) (interviewing linguistic anthropologist
John Gumperz). The meta-pragmatic level of language is the one that “regiments” underlying grammar
into moral and ideological outcomes. Michael Silverstein, Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic
Function, in REFLEXIVE LANGUAGE: REPORTED SPEECH AND METAPRAGMATICS 47–48 (John A.
Lucy ed., 1993).
29. Contrast this division with the characterization in AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 12, at
45–47, 108, 122, of both precedent and cases-at-hand as dependent on paradigmatic categorization. The
chronological focal point and author may matter. Supreme Court Justices’ opinions are acts of decision
that perform the work of turning present cases into past precedent. This imperative may conceal just
how contingent a pending controversy’s fit with a precedential category is. By contrast, this article
addresses an advocate’s more urgent earlier moment of persuasively making the case, at which point
the outcome is uncertain.
30. See RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS: AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE
7–11 (1992) (decrying an entrenched “dichotomy” between narrative and law while still distinguishing
narrative “style” from legal “substance”).
31. See Roman Jakobson, Grammatical Parallelism and Its Russian Facet, 42 LANGUAGE 399, 399
(1966) (noting the cross-cultural fundamentality of parallelism).
32. See KENNETH BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION 101–02 (1966) (arguing against the
claim that rhetorics and poetics are mutually exclusive); STEVEN C. CATON, “PEAKS OF YEMEN I
SUMMON”: POETICS AS CULTURAL PRACTICE IN A NORTH YEMENI TRIBE 155–56 (1990) (drawing on
Burke to outline an inherent connection between poetics, persuasion, and politics).
33. See Elinor Ochs & Bambi Schieffelin, Language Has a Heart, 9 TEXT 7, 9 (1989) (arguing that
people need to be able to “convey and assess” emotion in order to “interpret and respond to” semantic
arguments).
34. See Douglas Hollan & C. Jason Throop, Whatever Happened to Empathy?: Introduction, 36
ETHOS 385, 391–92 (2008) (noting that emotion is central to affording empathetic responses, though the
latter may be used to harm as much as to help); Joseph Singer, Persuasion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2442,
2453–56 (1989) (arguing that both empathy and introspection are indispensable components of
persuasion).
35. See ALESSANDRO DURANTI, FROM GRAMMAR TO POLITICS 144–45 (1994) (arguing that
ascribing agency to good and bad actions in grammatically different ways helps constitute social and
political structure).
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of that balance through the rhetoric of the minister’s speech was a key
demonstration of his—and, by extension, Iraq’s—viability as a legitimate and
trustworthy contractual partner.36 In sum, both the style and the substance of
persuasion unfold narratively through the poetics of the ideological
configuration of rational and emotional logics. The speech, which consumed
substantial resources to produce and deliver, helped establish a persuasive
framework for the eventual terms of the debt restructuring deal.37
Figure 1: Moral Persuasion in Legal Narrative

Syntactic Form

Semantic and
Pragmatic Target

Meta-Pragmatic
Indexicality

Rational Logic

Categorize current
case according to
precedent

Attain desirable
result

Rational framing
of events: Call to
action

Emotional Logic

Configure current
case as outside
categorical bounds

Avoid
undesirable
result

Affective framing
of events:
Warning

IV
A SPEECH ON THE SEINE
On November 17, 2004, the Secretariat of the Paris Club, an informal
grouping of creditor countries,38 formally opened debt restructuring negotiations
between the Republic of Iraq and nineteen other states.39 On the table were a
plurality of the debt claims against Iraq, which, when reconciled, totaled over
fifty-one billion dollars. If the Club’s fractious membership could agree on the
terms of a deal that Iraq also would accept, the Club’s “comparable treatment”
requirement (its version of a most-favored-nation clause) would effectively
shield Iraq in other negotiations by preventing it from giving better repayment
terms to any other contractual creditor. Minister of Finance Adil AbdulMahdi’s brief (fewer than one-thousand words) opening remarks set forth
Iraq’s view of the scene and the stakes.40

36. See MICHAEL HERZFELD, CULTURAL INTIMACY: SOCIAL POETICS IN THE NATION-STATE
141–45 (1997) (equating social interaction and organization with rhetoric).
37. Cf. Donald Brenneis, Telling Troubles: Narrative, Conflict, and Experience, in DISORDERLY
DISCOURSE, supra note 14, at 41, 49 (contending that the act of narration during conflicts “engenders
and transforms social experience”).
38. See Club de Paris, http://www.clubdeparis.org (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
39. One of the nineteen left negotiations before the parties reached an accord.
40. Adil Abdul-Mahdi, Minister of Finance of the Republic of Iraq, Address at a Meeting of the
Paris Club (Nov. 17, 2004) (on file with Law and Contemporary Problems). Reports indicate the
minister stuck to the script. Because the speech was delivered orally, a complete account of what
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In the first substantive lines of the speech, the minister laid out the problem
in terms that interweave the logics of reason and emotion:
What is at stake here is whether the Republic of Iraq will be able quickly to recover
from the horrors of three wars, the corruption and brutality of the Saddam regime,
and the social instability that has followed the overthrow of Saddam. If Iraq can
recover—quickly and convincingly—great benefits will flow to the Middle East region
and to the rest of the world. But if Iraq remains paralyzed by continuing social and
41
political instability, the cost to all of us will be unimaginably high.

First, the problem itself is framed in moral terms loaded with affective
markers: horror, corruption, brutality, instability, unimaginably high costs, and,
twice, the name Saddam, which the discourse surrounding the 1990 Gulf War
made synonymous with evil for many people around the world.42
Second, the minister frames proposals for addressing the problem in
rational, consequence-oriented terms. The subjunctive bifurcation of possible
end results is a narrative device called “sideshadowing.”43 Each if–then phrase
reproduces an ideal form of deductive reasoning. By juxtaposing them, the
minister gives his interlocutors a clear consequence-oriented choice, either
“great benefits” or “unimaginably high costs,” depending on whether and how
they choose to reduce Iraq’s debt burden. The stress on “can recover” conveys
both the contingency and the desirability of the first possibility. The
undesirability of the second possible outcome is conveyed by the negative,
affective descriptions of “remain[ing] paralyzed” and “unimaginably high
costs.”
Third, the redeployment of the emotional logic set forth in the passage’s
first sentence to undermine the undesirable possibility in its final sentence
points to a category problem the minister had to overcome throughout his
speech. The simplest approach to negotiations would have been to request one
of the Paris Club’s existing standard packages, such as “Cologne” or “Lyon”

happened in the meeting would ideally include a description of how the audience shaped it before,
during, and after delivery. See Alessandro Duranti, The Audience as Co-author: An Introduction, 6
TEXT 239, 240–43 (1986) (describing how the meaning of an oration depends substantially on real-time
audience activities and interpretations). Those details are not available. However, reading written legal
texts also generates meaning dynamically and interactively. JAMES B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE
THEIR MEANING 18 (1984). More people read the speech more times and in more varied contexts than
heard it in Paris.
41. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40 (emphasis in original).
42. By 2004, English-speaking media often referred to the Iraqi leader as simply “Saddam.” See,
e.g., Blair Shewchuk, Saddam or Mr. Hussein?, CBC NEWS ONLINE (Feb. 2003), http://www.cbc.ca.
news/indepth/words/saddam_hussein.html (investigating the reasons). The use of first names in English
usually indicates solidarity, affiliation, or allegiance. D.J. Allerton, Proper Names and Definite
Descriptions with the Same Reference: A Pragmatic Choice for Language Users, 25 J. PRAGMATICS 621,
622, 632 (1996). The use of “Saddam,” which is taken by English speakers to be a first name regardless
of Arabic convention in Iraq, appears to be a hyperbolically performative subversion of this practice to
convey non-alignment instead.
43. GARY S. MORSON, NARRATIVE AND FREEDOM 40–41 (1994). Subjunctivity in legal narrative
creates space to advance counterfactual arguments. See Cover, supra note 12, at 4–5 (positing narrative
as the force that connects legal norms to both actuality and possibility).
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terms.44 However, at the time, no country had ever received the massive level of
debt reduction Iraq was seeking, leaving no categorical basis for rational
comparison. The failure of numerous poor, conflict-ridden countries to
transform their emotionally compelling cases into such a precedent meant that
an emotion-based moral warning also was unlikely to persuade creditors.45 By
setting forth an emotional appeal based on the awful present, offering two
alternative outcomes based on rational if–then logic, and making one of those
alternatives loop back to the terrible present, the minister enlists rational logic
to emphasize how bad it would be to leave Iraq in such a highly specific and
uncategorized context, without having to concede that Iraq’s circumstances
merited exceptional treatment. Later in the speech, the minister similarly
addresses concerns that Iraq’s untapped oil wealth mitigated the need to cut its
debt. His response again is constructed as a rational choice (“We can either
devote our resources to repaying Saddam era debts, or we can apply those
resources toward rebuilding Iraq’s oil production capacity for the common
benefit”),46 with an affective marker (the “Saddam era”) leading one possibility
back to the problematic present.
The minister recasts this double-stranded story from his opening passage
two additional times, in two subsections explicitly separated in the written text.47
In the first, the minister disclaims the interjection of an Iraqi narrative or using
it as a justification: “We all know the motivations that led Saddam to
accumulate this debt, and we all know how he spent the money. I am not going
to retell that story here or draw any conclusions from it.”48 Leaving unspoken
the affective experience of the Iraqi people (which, as a former exile, includes
his own) pays lip service to the language ideology of impersonal reference while
creating a powerful rhetorical effect through the presupposition of a shared
truth. This truth is evinced by the phrase, “we all know,” which is used twice,
and sedimented by the minister’s refusal to “retell” the story, which implies a
first telling that already happened and was accepted. Through this ostensibly

44. See Club de Paris, supra note 38.
45. See, e.g., Gumisai Mutuma, Africa Struggles for Global Attention, 17 AFR. RECOVERY 10
(2003) (expressing concern that international attention on the crisis in Iraq was “sidelining” Africa),
available at http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol17no2/172iraq.htm; Craig Smith, Major
Creditors Agree to Cancel 80% of Iraq Debt, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004 (noting the unprecedented
nature of Iraq’s final Paris Club deal, which in fact gave less relief than some Club members initially
wished), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/22/international/middleeast/22debt.html; Charles
Mutasa, Global Apartheid and African Debt Crisis (Life Over Debt, Discussion Paper Series Issue 3,
2005) (accusing the U.S. government of racial hypocrisy for supporting debt relief for Iraq that it had
not advocated for sub-Saharan African countries), available at http://www.afsc.org/
AfricaLifeOverDebt/ht/a/GetDocumentAction/i/43866. This public commentary directly challenged
Iraq’s worthiness in comparison with other debilitated states. Some drew on more distant historical
precedents more favorable to Iraq. See infra text accompanying note 70.
46. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
47. Listeners may not have appreciated these subdivisions, although a pause by the speaker at the
written dividing points may have conveyed the separation aurally. The speech was later posted onto a
website for the Trade Association for Emerging Markets.
48. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
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transparent presupposition and non-telling of the story, its moral basis is not
opened up to evaluation by the audience.
Lest there be doubt, the minister supplies the correct evaluative stance with
the admonition contained in the first four words of the subsequent sentence:
“But everyone should recognize that unlike countries whose borrowings finance
growth and development, Saddam borrowed much of this money to make war
upon his neighbors, to threaten the international community and to oppress his
own people.”49 From the strictly rational point of view presented in the if–then
clauses in the speech’s opening passage, Saddam’s reasons and uses should not
matter to the resolution of the problem. Either the debt is reduced, to
everyone’s benefit, or it is not, to everyone’s detriment. In addition, a main
reason the Iraqi Government and its advisors took great pains to distance
themselves from the odious debt “doctrine” was the difficulty of distilling its
heavily emotional–moral grammar into rational, deductive terms.50 By
nevertheless invoking that grammar using a rhetorically effective three-part
list—make war, threaten, and oppress51—the minister appeals obliquely to the
audience’s morality. It is both oblique and an appeal to moral action because of
the grammatical mood marker “should recognize” (the only one of its type in
the speech), which implies truth–value dependent on human control.52 He also
sets up a moral counterpoint to private creditors’ anticipated claims for
preferential treatment because their goods or services went to education,
healthcare, or civilian infrastructure.
Finally, as with his opening passage, the minister focuses his direct appeal in
ideologically preferred terms:
Only three things about Iraq’s debt stock need to be highlighted for present purposes:
First, it is gargantuan in size. . . . [T]he debt claims against Iraq total at least $125
billion. . . . Second, a debt stock that size is visibly unsustainable under any scenario.
Third, for so long as that debt stock—or any significant part of it—remains in place,
53
Iraq will not be able to attract the investment it needs . . . .

These enumerated “realities,”54 as the minister subsequently calls them,
connect in an ideologically preferred chain of fact-based reasoning that
combines a mathematical figure and the technocratic term “unsustainable” to
reach the conclusion that brute economics minimally requires categorization of

49. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
50. See Buchheit, Gulati & Thompson, supra note 5 (discussing the adjudicative difficulties caused
by the moral ambiguities of the odious debt doctrine).
51. See Gail Jefferson, List-Construction as a Task and Resource, in INTERACTION COMPETENCE
63–66, 68, 73 (George Psathas ed., 1990), for the “programmatic relevance” of three-part lists in
everyday conversation.
52. See RANDOLPH QUIRK ET AL., A COMPREHENSIVE GRAMMAR OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
§ 4.49, at 219–20 (1985) (comparing intrinsic and extrinsic modality (the formal term for such mood
markers)).
53. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
54. Lists have rhetorical qualities that reinforce rational logic and distance texts from emotional
logic. Cf. Deborah Schiffrin, Making a List, 17 DISCOURSE PROCESSES 377, 380–84 (1994) (discussing
the functional contrast between lists and narratives).
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Iraq within the class of countries that have already obtained Paris Club debt
reduction deals.55
In the second subsection of the speech, labeled “The Logic” in the written
text, the minister reiterates the duality of rationality and emotion. In this, the
heart of the speech, he leads with the preferred rational logic: “The logic behind
eliminating the large majority of this debt stock is compelling. The potential
costs to the international community of continued instability in Iraq are
unthinkably high. This is not a national or even a regional problem; it is a global
problem.”56 The first sentence sets forth the need to act in ideologically
preferred terms by asserting compelling “logic,” in its conventional reasonbased connotation. The second sentence cements this consequence-orientation
by offering the disfavored affective alternative, “unthinkably high” costs
(echoing the “unimaginably high” costs in the speech’s opening passage).
Against the backdrop of the first two sentences, the third sentence compresses
the three narrative features of trouble, tension between authenticity and
coherence, and temporality to effectuate the fourth feature, a moral stance. The
rhetorical effect of the repetition of “problem” in the third sentence is
enhanced by its change in valence and scale from not “national” to not
“regional” to, in fact, “global.” Repetition is a rhetorical technique used to
evoke a coherent vision of the world, which in this case builds toward a literal
declaration of a global problem.57 Embedded within this rhetoric, the noun,
“problem,” is not offered as a standalone assertion (“this is a problem”), but as
already modified by either “national or regional” or “global,” which
immediately situates the trouble in one or another presupposed categorical
narrative: national–regional troubles versus global troubles. The selection of
“global problem” unites speaker and audience in several ways. First, it aligns
their temporal experience by implying a shared resource of past precedent
55. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) produces “debt sustainability” analyses. In fact, Iraq’s
was deemed to require much greater debt reduction than other countries’ previous restructurings.
Euromoney implicitly exposed the rational-emotional ideological contour when it reported that
“[f]ormer [Paris] Club chairman [Jean-Pierre] Jouyet says that ‘even if you are politically minded, all
the decisions in the Paris Club are based on debt sustainability calculations made by the IMF, and we
are very strict on this point.’ But it’s very easy to be sceptical about the Fund’s debt sustainability
analysis for Iraq, not least because it’s based on an oil price of $26 a barrel.” Felix Salmon, Paris Club
Members Adapt to New Rules, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 212.
56. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
57. See Deborah Tannen, Repetition in Conversation: Toward a Poetics of Talk, 63 LANGUAGE
574, 576 (1987) (arguing that repetition in speech provides coherence to discourse and therefore to the
message that discourse conveys). It is formulated here as another three-part contrastive list, which can
be an especially powerful combination in political speechmaking. See John Heritage & David
Greatbatch, Generating Applause: A Study of Rhetoric and Response at Party Political Conferences, 92
AM. J. SOC. 110, 116–17, 122–27 (1986) (extending Atkinson’s discussion of contrasts and lists in
political speeches); Jefferson, supra note 51 (concerning tripartite lists). A similar narrative tactic can
be seen in President Johnson’s 1965 “We Shall Overcome” speech, in which he declared, “There is no
Negro problem. There is no Southern problem. There is no Northern problem. There is only an
American problem.” President Lyndon Johnson, Address to the U.S. Congress (Mar. 15, 1965).
President Johnson, like Minister Abdul-Mahdi, was making a political speech to achieve a legal
objective (in his case, civil rights legislation).
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(previous global problems) and solutions (how those problems were resolved).
Second, it seeks to circumvent the narrative tension between authenticity and
coherence by universalizing Iraq’s problems, which echoes the strategy earlier
in the speech of presupposing that “we all know” the cause of Iraq’s misery.
Finally, these referential connotations are complemented by the fact that a
global problem is also personal to everyone, which pre-empts the need to
provide a justification for addressing the trouble.
In the remainder of the second subsection, the minister expands his dualistic
theme in a series of sentences that alternate between a declarative deductive
chain that leads to the desired result of massive debt relief and affectively
marked alternatives if the relief is not forthcoming. To illustrate this narrative
tactic, use of the first theme in the following excerpt is marked A and use of the
second theme B, with the conclusion labeled C:
A Stability in Iraq will require a massive reconstruction effort . . .
A That reconstruction effort will require all the resources that Iraq can generate . . .
B But those resources . . . will be painfully inadequate . . .
A Iraq must receive large investments from the private sector . . .
B It is fanciful to believe that Iraq will be able to attract those investments . . .
A The existing debt stock must therefore be drastically reduced . . .
A [W]ithout robust recovery, instability in Iraq may continue.
B [T]he costs of that instability will be felt by everyone.
C Writing off these Saddam era claims is a relatively inexpensive way to reduce the
risk that the world will have to confront the costs of dealing with continued instability
58
in Iraq and the region.

The abstract, rational chain of A sentences is driven by the repeated use of
grammatical mood markers that mark statements as independent of human
control for their truth-value:59 will require, must receive, must be reduced, and
may continue.60 By contrast, the dominant feature of the B sentences is
ideologically disfavored affective markers—painful, fanciful, believe, attract,

58. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
59. See QUIRK ET AL., supra note 52, at 219–20 (comparing intrinsic and extrinsic modality).
60. The last A line incorporates elements of emotional logic by referring to the existing political
instability that may continue absent economic recovery. To complete the overall rational chain
culminating in the C conclusion, it was necessary to laminate the A and B lines. At the time of the
speech, debt reduction was still a counterfactual situation. Inverting the last A line into the negative,
existing scenario allows that line to import emotional elements and creates a hook for the last B line so
that together they drive toward the conclusion. This counterfactual situation might explain why the last
A line has a relatively downgraded mood of “may continue” rather than the more forceful “will
continue.” It may have seemed unpersuasively presumptuous to assert rather than merely predict
continuing chaos. However, Iraqi officials subsequently did assert that debt reduction was a necessary
condition for the return of stability. See Ali A. Allawi, Why Iraq’s Debt Deal Makes Sense,
EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 213 (writing, “I do not for a moment want to suggest that debt relief is a
sufficient condition for social and political stability to return to Iraq. But it is certainly a necessary
condition.”).
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and felt—that reinforce the negative alternative if debt relief is not granted. The
fugal alternation of themes in this passage highlights how both the rational and
emotional logics have narrative potential through parallel structure. The
former’s lead and latter’s echo of words like resources, investments, and
instability reinforce the lopsided ideological preference for rational over
emotional logic. The force of both themes combines in the concluding C
sentence, where the subjunctive risk warned of in the B sentences can be
diminished by a solution based on the A sentences.
Only at the end of his speech, which is separated by five asterisks and the
subheading “Conclusion” in the written text, does the minister explicitly engage
emotional logic. Yet even here, the emotional and personal aspects of the
narrative, which the minister expresses as “political,” are couched as an
objective “observation” he makes about the emotional state of his people:
Allow me to make one further observation of a political nature. The Iraqi people
regard themselves as the principal victim of the Saddam regime. They also look upon
the debts that Saddam accumulated as one aspect of that victimization—an aspect that
unfortunately will continue to haunt the people of Iraq for decades to come. Although
the Interim Government wishes to behave responsibly in settling these issues, no
Government in Iraq can ignore the deeply-held sentiments of the Iraqi people
61
concerning these claims.

It is common for speakers to fragment and distribute social responsibility by
framing their words as coming from other people.62 The minister extends this
practice by ascribing an emotional state to the Iraqi people. Doing so distances
himself and the Interim Government from the barely veiled threat in the last
sentence. That threat is the one instance in his speech in which consequenceoriented logic is explicitly framed in emotional terms.
Each section of the minister’s speech employs the core features of narrative
as a scaffold for a legal language ideology that emphasizes reference-oriented
rational logic and suppresses context-dependent emotional logic. The
interweaving of those logics results in one cohesive narrative about the Iraqi
debt crisis. That narrative is both a story and a plan.
V
TALK INTO MONEY
The minister’s speech was not confined to its specific place, moment, and
linguistic genre. Delivering it was necessarily a speech-act that equally
necessarily nestled within a logic of intertextual relationships.63 Constructing

61. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40 (emphases added).
62. See MARJORIE H. GOODWIN, HE-SAID-SHE-SAID: TALK AS SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AMONG
BLACK CHILDREN 90 (1990) (expanding Goffman’s seminal account of how speakers animate third
parties to include not only direct attribution of others’ talk or actions but also how others are situated
socially by virtue of where they are or identifying characteristics).
63. See WILLIAM F. HANKS, INTERTEXTS: WRITINGS ON LANGUAGE, UTTERANCE, AND
CONTEXT 111, 168, 172 (2000) (explaining that a text is a “mode of social action” that has
communicative relevance largely by virtue of being “situated within a larger network” of texts); John
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Iraq’s debt situation in language ideological terms was only the first step;
implementing those terms on the ground had to follow.64 The narrative begun at
the Paris Club in 2004 continued after an accord was reached, as attention
turned in 2005 to making a deal with Iraq’s hundreds of private creditors. The
message in the minister’s opening remarks was adapted across additional public
statements that counsel shaped; among these were the minister’s closing
remarks at the November 2004 Club meeting; interviews by him and Central
Bank of Iraq Governor Sinan Al-Shabibi in Euromoney; an article in that
journal by Dr. Abdul-Mahdi’s successor, Ali A. Allawi; financial officials’
speeches at a forum for large private creditors held in Dubai in May 2005; and
various smaller-group meetings and phone calls.65 The narrative also flowed into
the contracts and other formal documents of the debt restructuring program
itself.
For example, the basic terms of any debt reduction agreement with private
creditors were set by the comparable treatment provision of the Paris Club
accord. This achievement overcame the category problem that faced the
minister at the outset of his speech: the Paris Club deal operated as a precedent
upon which Iraq could draw in rational terms in negotiations with its private
creditors. At the same time, comparable treatment did not determine every
detail, including the calculation of late interest, which had significant financial
implications because of the long lapse since default in 1990. To calculate the
amount of debt owed prior to cutting it, late interest on Paris Club debt claims
was reconciled according to the contractual terms, whereas late interest for
private creditors was subjected to a uniform rate regardless of the accounting
method and amount of past-due interest a private creditor had applied to each
individual claim.66 This policy, together with a specialized arbitration
mechanism, was the most unusual compared to other debt restructurings,
sovereign or otherwise.

Searle, What is a Speech Act?, in PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 221, 221–22 (Max Black ed., 1965) (arguing
that linguistic communication is irreducibly composed of both a stretch of language and its socially
effective production).
64. See Susan U. Philips, Constructing a Tongan Nation-State through Ideology in the Courtroom, in
REGIMES, supra note 16, 229, at 244–45 (layering secondary sites of meta-pragmatic commentary that
create language ideologies (such as courts) on top of primary sites in which those language ideologies
are used in everyday life).
65. See, e.g., Felix Salmon, Restructuring Debt Is Top Priority, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2004, at 72
(interviewing Minister Abdul-Mahdi on the subject of the debt before the Paris Club meeting); Allawi,
supra note 60, at 210 (promising that Iraq would “vigorously” work to complete its debt restructuring,
in narrative terms that often recapitulated Minister Abdul-Mahdi’s opening remarks); Kathryn Wells,
Iraq Restructures Saddam Debt, EUROMONEY, Feb. 2006, at 54 (reporting on the stages leading up to
Iraq’s “ground-breaking” debt-for-debt exchange and noting Dr. Al-Shabibi’s role in overseeing the
process). Others, of course, constructed their own narratives of these events. See, e.g., How the Iraq
Deal Was Done, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2005, at 210 (reading Iraq’s Paris Club accord against a longer
political history of Paris Club deals, and emphasizing the role of individual political leadership in
cementing the Iraq accord).
66. Some Paris Club members voluntarily applied a uniform rate in accordance with their own
policies.
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Some creditors, including powerful institutions and their influential leaders,
reacted angrily. They typically argued either that contracts must be honored or
that their claims were for debt incurred for civilian purposes. These arguments
had both rational and emotional features. Within the dominant global narrative
of Iraqi political history since 1990, the claim concerning civilian use is a
relatively straightforward referential contrast between civilian–good and
military–bad. Precisely because of that narrative, the claim that the contract
must be honored is trickier. Classical speech-act theory would support it on the
basis that a promise commits a promisor, regardless of context.67 An op-ed in
The New York Times adopted this view, dismissing even “prudent” (rational)
arguments that punitive financial burdens can backfire because Iraq “must
respect one of the first principles of the rule of law: contracts should be
honored.”68 The emotional logic of the creditors’ arguments surfaced in
individuals’ patent fury and through the emphasis on fairness, which law
training treats as non-legal and emotional.69
The narrative established by Minister Abdul-Mahdi’s opening remarks to
the Paris Club foreshadowed Iraq’s response in several ways. First, as noted in
section IV, the Iraqis emphasized the oppressive aspects of Saddam Hussein’s
profligacy, so that the emotional costs far outweighed any benefits. Second,
because Iraqi debt had been in payment default for fifteen years, over which
time late interest compounded, Iraq’s advisors pointed out that even small
differences in how creditors booked that interest could lead to much more
dramatic divergences in debt sums than would have been predicted when the
contracts were made. This rational arithmetic counter-principle supported the
emotional counter-argument that the uniform rate better adhered to the
principle of intercreditor equity. The speech less directly presages this
argument—it was not designed to—but the categorical appeal to Iraq’s debt as
a “global problem” initiates a theme of solidarity. Iraq’s representatives and
friends also deployed this theme to remind creditors of disastrous alternative
precedents, most infamously the dispute over German reparations after the
First World War.70 Finally and most decisively, the Iraqis stressed that time was
of the essence. It was difficult enough to reconcile more than eleven thousand
individual private debt claims, but to investigate the circumstances of each claim
would have been infinitely time-consuming and adjudicatively complex, if not
impossible. The minister’s speech in 2004 repeatedly hit the theme of rapid
motion toward the future rather than bogging down in the present. He
contrasted Iraq’s need to “recover quickly” with it “remaining paralyzed” and
67. See generally John H. Searle, How To Derive “Ought” from “Is”, 73 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW
43 (1964) (acknowledging, however, that extenuating circumstances could negate the promise).
68. Mark Medish, Make Baghdad Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2003/11/04/opinion/make-baghdad-pay.html.
69. See MERTZ, supra note 20, at 121. Of course, like all aspects of morality, fairness remains a
factor when the ultimate bases for the legal system are under discussion.
70. See, e.g., Medish, supra note 68 (citing Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz’s view that failure to
cancel Iraqi debt would repeat the mistakes of the Treaty of Versailles).
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“remaining in place” and with its “continued instability.” These terms exhibit a
subtle but grammatically remarkable shade of the rational–emotional
distinction. The active verb “recover” links the desirable outcome to
consequence-oriented, future-looking motion, while the present progressive
tense of the other verbs connects the undesirable possibility to Iraq’s specific,
problematic circumstances.
The speech is even more explicit. Its last substantive sentence emphasizes
the urgency in a final deployment of rational if–then logic: “In short, if we all
wish to settle this problem, we must do it now . . . .”71 That problem, of course,
was global. Establishing this urgency early on in ideologically persuasive form
helped to overcome resistance when the commercial-claim reconciliation terms
were announced. The Iraq debt restructuring team even rationalized creditors’
complaints by re-narrating their individual emotional–moral appeals in
generalized referential terms. The team devised a standard letter to respond to
any such complaint, erasing each creditor’s personal narrative.72 While not
entirely determined in advance, the way in which Iraq’s debt restructuring
narrative took actionable shape at the negotiating table in Paris later became a
basis for translating those negotiations into specific substantive provisions of
the debt restructuring deal.
VI
CONCLUSION
The legal tale of Iraq’s debt restructuring program—and there must be no
mistake that this was a legal tale, for at the end of the day, the program is
represented by a thick set of binding contracts covering tens of billions of
dollars and hundreds of parties—is one that participants themselves narrated.
They strove to mediate the tension between authenticity and coherence and
between morality and law within the bounds imposed by the ideological
requirements of legal discourse. One such requirement that appears to cut
across many legal narratives, and stands out in the speech analyzed above, is the
construction of a particular rhetorical configuration of reason and emotion. This
process is neither insincere nor self-contradictory. Whatever purposeful artistry
these kinds of speech-acts involve, they also reflect deeply ingrained linguistic
habits regulated by a system of social rewards and punishments.73 Much as
71. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
72. Language ideologies tend to “erase” “facts that are inconsistent with the ideological scheme,”
including by homogenizing situations that do not fit. Judith Irvine & Susan Gal, Language Ideology and
Linguistic Differentiation, in REGIMES, supra note 16, at 35, 38. Not unfeelingly, the standard letter was
dubbed the “Naked City letter,” after the dispiriting metropolitan tagline to the eponymous TV series
(earlier a film), “There are eight million stories in the Naked City. This has been one of them.” See Lee
C. Buchheit, Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts, 10 BUS. L. INT’L 211, 211 n.16
(2009) (reproducing a similar response by Iraq’s Central Bank Governor to a creditor’s committee).
73. PIERRE BOURDIEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMBOLIC POWER 37–38 (Gino Raymond & Matthew
Adamson trans., Polity Press 1991) (1982) (situating individualistic linguistic acts on a field of social
competence governed by habitus and a “market” of “sanctions and censorships”).
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Galileo’s science was not solely the product of laboratory-based conviction, but
also developed through the performance of scientific philosophy in the morally
approved Renaissance-court style (sprezzatura),74 legal professionals’ practices
blend referential argumentation and social contextualization according to
norms of lawyerly performance.
Effective performances draw on specific cultural knowledge,75 the mastery of
which often endows specialized elites such as lawyers with a particular role in
narrative construction. Clients may benefit even more from lawyers’ inside
knowledge of a system and its players than from counsel’s command of abstract
legal principles.76 In Iraq’s case, the Paris Club itself was negotiating between a
history of feudal procedures reminiscent of The Wizard of Oz on one hand,77
and its increasingly institutionalized role in rationalizing international economic
relations on the other.78 Iraq’s counsel used background knowledge of the Paris
Club to insist that their clients would neither sleep nor eat in the basement nor
address the Club through pages or Dumas-esque secret messages. Minister
Abdul-Mahdi made his opening remarks not as supplicant, but as a member of
the rational discursive community: “My colleagues and I have met privately
with many of you over the past few months, and I believe there is a strong
consensus that these are indeed the realities now facing Iraq and its creditors.”79
Here, “meeting privately” suggests conferral among equals; “consensus”
invokes an express Paris Club principle, demonstrating expert knowledge;
“realities” are referential facts; and Iraq and its creditors are described as facing
them collectively. That sentence combines cultural knowledge and language

74. See generally MARIO BIAGIOLI, GALILEO, COURTIER (1993). Compare U.S. politics, where
candidates and the electorate attend to two distinct discourses of “truth” and “theater” and perform or
evaluate performance in terms of these discourses. Jane Hill, “Read My Article.” Ideological
Complexity and the Overdetermination of Promising in American Presidential Politics, in REGIMES,
supra note 16, at 259.
75. Linda Garro, Cultural Knowledge as Resource in Illness Narratives, in NARRATIVE AND THE
CULTURAL CONSTRUCTION OF ILLNESS AND HEALING 70 (Cheryl Mattingly & Linda Garro eds.,
2000).
76. CONLEY & O’BARR, supra note 18, at 94. This distribution of value is ironic in light of the
privilege accorded to rational logic by legal language ideology.
77. Brian Caplen, Paris Club Comes Under Attack, EUROMONEY, Sept. 2000, at 56.
78. The Club’s first-ever annual report in 2007 can be read as an effort at making its texts and
practices transparent (a contemporary trend among other financial institutions as well, such as central
banks, ALAN S. BLINDER, THE QUIET REVOLUTION 5 (2004)). In it, the Club insisted that “[k]ey
elements such as membership, working practices and the structure of Paris Club agreements were
already in place by the early 1970s, when the Paris Club’s activity was much lower than in subsequent
decades . . . . [T]he fact that its key features have not changed significantly can be seen as proof of their
consistency and one of the reasons explaining the Club’s longevity.” PARIS CLUB, ANNUAL REPORT 37
(2007). It then summarized five “key principles” aimed at “maximum efficiency.” Id. at 40. Through
statements like these, the reader is invited to view the Club as a rational organization easily understood
in context-independent, referential terms.
79. Abdul-Mahdi, supra note 40.
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ideology to place the minister on an even footing with his audience early on.80
He also can leverage that even footing at the end of the speech to voice the
Iraqi people’s emotional suffering as something stronger than a plea for grace.
Moreover, the professional ground occupied by lawyers permits them to
intervene in and even become part of narratives broader than those of single
clients. With respect to the sovereign debt restructuring field, in 2009, the
government of Ecuador’s decision to default on foreign debt payments despite
outside perception that it had the means to make its payments triggered a stern
rebuke from Ecuador’s erstwhile sovereign debt counsel (who, incidentally, was
also Iraq’s). The press picked the story up as one of a “godfather” and
“institution” banishing the black sheep to preserve the credit-worthiness of the
rest of the flock.81 In his own co-authored article assessing the Ecuadorian
move, the attorney traced the country’s ostensible legal justification to the
revival of the odious debt doctrine in the Iraqi debt restructuring.82 That is, the
Ecuadorians seized upon the revival of the odious debts narrative to alter the
legal terms of their situation. Their critics responded partly by rejecting that
narrative and seeking others to describe the Ecuadorian action. Even this brief
sketch of competing narratives—odious debt versus black sheep—hints at a
language ideological pattern to each side’s justifications that parallels the Iraqi
case. Attunement to patterns like this one can help practitioners stay ahead.
Narrative tactics emerge along the fault lines of broader social practices.83 The
Ecuadorian maneuver was possible because lenders opened a contractual
loophole years earlier when they dropped longstanding prohibitions on
borrowers repurchasing their own obligations, which allowed Ecuador to drive
down the price of its debt by defaulting and then scooping up the devalued
assets.84 “The justification, if there was one,” Ecuador’s former counsel writes
about what in retrospect looks like lenders’ naiveté in creating the loophole,
“must have been that no sovereign bond issuer would risk its market reputation
by deliberately defaulting in order to manipulate the price of its bond to its own
benefit.”85 Lawyers are keenly attentive to such isolated rational deduction, as
well as warily sensitive to emotional arguments. Developing awareness as to

80. “Footing” is a technical term that describes how people position their own and others’ social
selves during linguistic interaction. See Erving Goffman, Footing, 25 SEMIOTICA 1, 4 (1979) (listing the
attributes of footing).
81. Felix Salmon, Emerging-market Debt After Ecuador, REUTERS (June 8, 2009), http://blogs.
reuters.com/felix-salmon/2009/06/08/emerging-market-debt-after-ecuador/.
82. Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, The Coroner’s Inquest, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 2009, at 22,
22–26.
83. See SHERRY ORTNER, HIGH RELIGION: A CULTURAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF SHERPA
BUDDHISM 13–15 (1989) (defining social structure as imbued with abstract as well as emotional
contradictions that inspire narratives of heroic action in response to these cultural contradictions).
“Tactics” represent individual flexibility of action enmeshed within the constraints of impersonal,
institutional “strategies” of power relations. 1 MICHEL DE CERTEAU, THE PRACTICE OF EVERYDAY
LIFE, at xix, 35–36 (Timothy J. Tomasik trans., 1998) (1994).
84. Buchheit & Gulati, supra note 82, at 22–26.
85. Id. at 25.
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how both unfold together in legal narrative can improve the depth of focus of
the profession’s habitual instrumentalist thinking.86 For those who share Cover’s
concern with justice, it may also illuminate ways to employ the ancient practice
of narrative persuasively in service of reform.

86. See Annelise Riles, Property as Legal Knowledge: Means and Ends, 10 J. ROYAL
ANTHROPOLOGICAL INST. 775, 790 (2004) (asserting that lawyerly thinking prizes knowledge
principally as a means to a further means in a telescoping analytic chain). Language ideologies operate
over a wide range of awareness on the part of those who exhibit them, with the most naturalized ones
being the least available to self-conscious manipulation. Paul V. Kroskrity, Arizona Tewa Kiva Speech
as a Manifestation of a Dominant Language Ideology, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES, supra note 16, at
117.

